Riparian Rights in a Polluted World: Property Right or Tort? by Daniel P. Fernandez
Barry Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 2 Spring 2017 Article 1
5-10-2017
Riparian Rights in a Polluted World: Property
Right or Tort?
Daniel P. Fernandez
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Other Law Commons,
Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Barry Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Barry Law Review by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Barry Law.
Recommended Citation
Daniel P. Fernandez (2017) "Riparian Rights in a Polluted World: Property Right or Tort?," Barry Law Review: Vol. 22 : Iss. 2 , Article
1.
Available at: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol22/iss2/1
 131 
RIPARIAN RIGHTS IN A POLLUTED WORLD: PROPERTY RIGHT OR 
TORT? 
Daniel P. Fernandez, J.D.*  
INTRODUCTION 
It is well-established in Florida law that ownership of land abutting navigable 
waters carries with it certain appurtenances,1 known as “riparian rights.”2 However, 
the landowner’s property must extend to the high-water line in order to convey 
riparian rights.3 And two major categories of riparian water-use rights “can be 
separated into nonconsumptive uses–generally those that do not involve 
withdrawing the water from its natural location–and consumptive uses–those that do. 
The primary nonconsumptive uses are navigation (or boating), fishing, and 
swimming.”4 In addition, nonconsumptive uses also include rights to view, wharfing, 
and access to the water.5 Yet members of the public also have the basic riparian rights 
of boating, fishing, and swimming in navigable waters.6 Given this state of riparian 
law, whether there is a distinction between the status or rights of a riparian owner 
and a member of the public as to the navigable waters presents an interesting 
question.   
 ________________________  
 * J.D., University of Florida; B.A., Florida State University. Daniel P. Fernandez has practiced in the areas 
of administrative, environmental, and water law for more than thirty-five years. In addition to private practice, he 
previously served as Director of the Eastern U. S. Water Law Center (University of Florida College of Law), Staff 
Director for the Florida Senate Natural Resources Committee, and General Counsel to the Southwest Florida Water 
Management District. He is currently an Associate Professor of Business Law at Florida Gulf Coast University. 
 1. Appurtenance: “That which belongs to something else; an adjunct; an appendage; something annexed to 
another thing more worthy as principal, and which passes as incident to it, as a right of way or other easement to 
land . . . .” What is APPURTENANCE?, THE LAW DICTIONARY: FEATURING BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY FREE 
ONLINE LEGAL DICTIONARY 2D ED., http://thelawdictionary.org/appurtenance/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) (citations 
omitted); “[A]n incidental right (such as a right-of-way) attached to a principal property right and passing in 
possession with it.” Appurtenance, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/appurtenance (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). 
 2. See FLA. STAT. § 253.141(1) (2017); Broward v. Mabry, 50 So. 826 (Fla. 1909); see also Ferry Pass 
Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n v. White’s River Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n, 48 So. 643, 644 (Fla. 1909) 
(“Riparian rights are incident to the ownership of lands contiguous to and bordering on navigable waters. The 
common-law rights of riparian owners with reference to the navigable waters are incident to the ownership of the 
uplands that extend to high-water mark. The shore or space between high and low water mark is a part of the bed of 
navigable waters, the title to which is in the state in trust for the public. If the owner of land has title to high-water 
mark, his land borders on the water, since the shore to high-water mark is a part of the bed of the waters; and, if it is 
a navigable waterway, he has as incident to such title the riparian rights accorded by the common law to such an 
owner.”).  
 3. Ferry Pass, 48 So. at 644; see also Teat v. City of Apalachicola, 738 So. 2d 413, 413–14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1999). 
 4. FRANK E. MALONEY, SHELDON J. PLAGER & FLETCHER N. BALDWIN, JR., WATER LAW AND 
ADMINISTRATION: THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE 32 (1968).  
 5. See id. at 98–99, 104, 116.   
 6. See, e.g., Broward, 50 So. at 829; see also Frost v. Wash. Cty. R.R., 51 A. 806, 809 (Me. 1901). 
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Some riparian rights are property rights exclusive to the riparian owner.7 These 
include accretion, reliction, access, wharfing, and view.8 However, activities of 
boating, fishing, and swimming are also public rights in navigable waters that exist 
by virtue of the Public Trust Doctrine, i.e., state ownership of submerged lands that 
are held in trust for public use.9 Accordingly, the riparian owners would merely share 
these rights as members of the public. Admittedly, riparian owners have a unique 
mode of access via their property. Yet if the riparian owner should lose the riparian 
rights, and they are also lost to the public, is this loss compensable to the riparian? 
More specifically, in a world where pollution spills into waterways are 
commonplace,10 does a riparian owner have a right superior to that of any member 
of the public to have the navigable waters kept free of pollution? One viewpoint may 
be that unless the riparian owner suffers a specific injury beyond that which is 
suffered by the public in general, an action brought by a riparian owner for pollution 
damages would be overlapped by any related action brought on behalf of the public.11 
Thus, the private action would be foreclosed by the action brought on behalf of the 
public.12 An alternative view may assert that riparian rights are property rights and 
that a riparian owner could maintain a separate action to protect those rights.13    
Accordingly, this analysis first examines whether, and which, riparian rights 
constitute property rights, and whether the riparian owner has rights superior to, or 
separate and distinct from, the public regarding adjacent navigable waters. Then, the 
inquiry addresses the central question, that is, whether under Florida law a riparian 
owner has a greater legal right than any member of the public to have the water 
abutting the landowner’s property kept free of pollution. 
I. NONCONSUMPTIVE RIPARIAN RIGHTS AS A FORM OF PROPERTY 
Section 253.141(1), Florida Statutes, states that riparian rights are not property 
rights.14 The statute provides: 
Riparian rights are those incident to land bordering upon navigable 
waters. They are rights of ingress, egress, boating, bathing, and 
fishing and such others as may be or have been defined by law. Such 
rights are not of a proprietary nature. They are rights inuring to the 
 ________________________  
 7. See, e.g., Broward, 50 So. at 830. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id.; see also Hope M. Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of Takings 
Jurisprudence?: The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches, 
19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 43–45 (1995) (discussing the purpose of the Public Trust Doctrine). 
 10. See, e.g., World Wildlife Fund, Marine Problems: Pollution, 
http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/blue_planet/problems/pollution/#TB (last visited Mar. 27, 2017) (discussing 
frequency of pollution spills into waterways). 
 11. See Frost, 51 A. at 809.  
 12. See id.  
 13. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 98–99.  
 14. This statute has an interesting and strange history dealing with navigability, submerged lands, taxation, 
and whether it even applies to riparian rights outside of the taxation context. See FLA. STAT. § 253.141 (2017). For 
a more extensive discussion, see MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4; see also RALPH E. 
BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 112.21(1)(b) (1984).  
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owner of the riparian land but are not owned by him or her. They 
are appurtenant to and are inseparable from the riparian land. The 
land to which the owner holds title must extend to the ordinary high 
watermark of the navigable water in order that riparian rights may 
attach. Conveyance of title to or lease of the riparian land entitles 
the grantee to the riparian rights running therewith whether or not 
mentioned in the deed or lease of the upland.15  
While this statute generally describes the common-law nonconsumptive riparian 
rights,16 the statement that these rights are not proprietary is overly broad.17 For 
example, the authoritative and highly respected treatise Water Law and 
Administration: The Florida Experience, provides a contrasting view: 
It seems clear that in Florida, as in most eastern jurisdictions, 
riparian rights are property, a lawful taking of which necessitates 
compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. But 
while this much may be clear, the precise quality of a riparian right 
as property is considerably less clear. The legal mind is accustomed 
to thinking about property as specific rights in relation to particular 
things, and visualizing objects of property that are inert in character 
and occupy an ascertainable situs, such as buildings and furniture. 
Jurists have experienced considerable difficulty in their efforts to 
apply traditional property concepts to an unfettered substance such 
as water. Attempts to solve the problem of who owns the water in a 
navigable stream or lake resulted in the early determination that 
there is no private property in the substance of flowing water; the 
most a person can have is a usufructuary right—right to use the 
water.18  
The concept of “usufructuary” rights in water is generally considered a 
consumptive use concept rather than a nonconsumptive use.19 Even if the owner of 
riparian land has a right to consumptive use of the water, it is not an ownership right 
as in tangible property but merely a right to use the water subject to the concurrent 
 ________________________  
 15. FLA. STAT. § 253.141(1) (2017) (emphasis added).  
 16. See id.   
 17. For cases referring to this provision as a statutory recognition of substantive riparian rights, previously 
numbered FLA. STAT. § 271.09 and FLA. STAT. § 192.61, see Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795, 800 (Fla. 1957), 
and Tri-State Enters., Inc. v. Berkowitz, 182 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), discussing that “[t]he riparian 
owner has certain preferential rights to acquire from the Trustees title to adjacent submerged sovereignty lands.” See 
also Carmazi v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Dade Cty., 108 So. 2d 318, 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (discussing how 
riparian rights “amount[] to a right of a landowner to use the water adjacent to his property and to be guaranteed the 
right of ingress to and egress from his property to the water adjacent thereto.”); Webb v. Giddens, 82 So. 2d 743, 
745 (Fla. 1955) (discussing how the riparian rights definition in the Florida Statutes is merely “a partial codification 
of the common law on the subject.); Feller v. Eau Gallie Yacht Basin, Inc., 397 So. 2d 1155, 1157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1981). 
 18. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 31–32 (emphasis added). 
 19. See Vill. of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663, 670–71 (Fla. 1979) (discussing permits for 
the consumptive use of water). 
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water use rights of others.20 Thus, no one owns the water in its free-flowing state.21 
However, a person can have “a usufructuary right—a right to use the water.”22 The 
Supreme Court of Florida first applied this rule of law in Village of Tequesta v. 
Jupiter Inlet Corp.23 Under the Tequesta decision, the landowner (or, by an extension 
of the concept, possibly a riparian owner along a surface water body) attains 
ownership in water only when it is actually captured (withdrawn) and put to use 
pursuant to a permit (or an exemption) from a water management district.24 It is 
significant that the Tequesta case dealt with the right to withdraw groundwater for 
consumptive use and not nonconsumptive riparian rights.25 Yet if some form of 
property right springs up by capturing and making a consumptive use of the water, 
then applying the same logic to a riparian owner who begins making a 
nonconsumptive use of the water in the river could arguably imbue the riparian 
owner with an actionable loss of that use separate and apart from the public.26   
While Tequesta clearly holds that there is no property right in groundwater until 
it has been put to beneficial use under a permit (or exemption), in apparent dictum, 
the court states, “There is a distinction when this right of user as to water has been 
invaded by circumstances showing an intentional invasion in an unreasonable 
manner or an unintentional invasion when the conduct was negligent, reckless, or 
ultrahazardous, resulting in a destruction of the right of user as to land.”27 The court’s 
language seems to imply some kind of prospective right.28 While rather tenuous, 
under this logic riparian owners may contend that a prospective intention to use the 
river adjacent to their riparian lands constitutes property. However, it is important to 
remember that Tequesta was a consumptive use case, not one involving the 
nonconsumptive uses of boating, fishing, or swimming and that Tequesta dealt with 
groundwater and not surface water.29 Thus, while certain riparian rights may be 
considered property in Florida, the question remains as to which ones, if any, and 
how and when they ripen or vest.   
 ________________________  
 20. Id. at 667.  
 21. Id. 
 22. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 32. 
 23. Vill. of Tequesta, 371 So. 2d at 667 (discussing the fact that ownership of water did not encompass a 
property interest in the water). 
 24. Id. at 667. See FLA. STAT. §§ 373.203–373.250 (2016), for the consumptive use permitting system 
administered by Florida’s five water management districts. See also Schick v. Fla. Dept. of Agric., 504 So. 2d 1318, 
1320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Vill. of Tequesta, 371 So. 2d at 667). 
 25. Vill. of Tequesta, 371 So. 2d at 665 (discussing whether it is possible for a municipality to affect a taking 
on an underground water source).  
 26. See id. at 667.  
 27. Id. at 668. But see Schick, 504 So. 2d at 1320 (stating that “appellants [were] deprived of the existing use 
of water in their wells and pipes” by pollution). 
 28. See Vill. of Tequesta, 371 So. 2d at 668.  
 29. Compare id. at 665, with Moore v. State Rd. Dep’t, 171 So. 2d 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (involving 
plaintiffs who sought injunction against construction of a new bridge proposed to be built that would not have a 
swing mechanism, therefore the passage of deep sea cargo ships and passenger ships were blocked from entering St. 
Andrews Bay).  
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II. EXCLUSIVE PRIVATE RIPARIAN RIGHTS VS. RIPARIAN RIGHTS SHARED 
WITH THE PUBLIC 
A. Access and Navigation 
While there seem to be substantial gray areas related to riparian rights, the 
riparian right of access to adjacent navigable waters appears to be imbued with the 
status of a property right.30 And the courts generally grant relief to a riparian owner 
when there is a material interference with or destruction of access.31 However, the 
exception seems to apply when the government has impaired riparian access 
specifically for the improvement of navigation.32  
While the riparian owner has the right of access from his property to the adjacent 
waters, the question of the extent of the ability to navigate about the water body 
remains somewhat unsettled.33 This has led some courts to evaluate the navigational 
aspects as to whether the access was meaningful.34 In cases where riparian owners 
were physically blocked from getting to the river, some courts seem to have imbued 
the riparian rights of access and navigation with the status of a property right that is 
slightly different (or unique) from that of the public at large.35 Generally, the public 
only has a right of access to navigable waters if there is a point of public access.36 
They do not have any right to trespass across private property (above the high water 
line) to get access to public waters.37 Riparian owners have access rights to both 
navigable and non-navigable waters adjacent to their land.38 
On the one hand, “some courts have held that the riparian [owner] has no 
protectable interest in navigating a waterway; his right to navigate is simply as a 
member of the public, and in the absence of some special injury he is without 
remedy.”39 For example, in Frost v. Washington County Railroad, the court said: 
The only right of the plaintiff interfered with . . . was his right of 
navigation by water in and out of the cove through the channel. This 
right of the plaintiff, however, was not his private property, nor even 
his private right. It could not be bought, sold, leased or inherited. He 
did not earn it, create it, or acquire it . . . . The right was the right of 
the public . . . . The plaintiff only shared in the public right . . . . The 
 ________________________  
 30. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 98 (citing Ferry Pass Inspectors’ & 
Shippers’ Ass’n v. White’s River Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n, 48 So. 643, 645 (Fla. 1909); Thiesen v. Gulf, Fla. 
& Ala. Ry., 78 So. 491, 507 (Fla. 1918)); see also Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795, 799 (Fla. 1957); Duval Eng’r 
& Contracting Co. v. Sales, 77 So. 2d 431, 434 (Fla. 1954); Tampa So. R.R. v. Nettles, 89 So. 223, 223 (Fla. 1921).  
 31. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 99.  
 32. See, e.g., Frost v. Wash. Cty. R.R., 51 A. 806, 809 (Me. 1901).  
 33. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 99.  
 34. See id. (discussing “that the public right to use the waterway as a highway would yield to other public 
needs when the general good required it.”).  
 35. See id. (discussing how the rights of ingress and egress amount to common law riparian rights). 
 36. See id. at 104–05. 
 37. See id.  
 38. Id. at 98.  
 39. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 100 (emphasis added). 
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sovereign had the absolute control of it, and could regulate, enlarge, 
limit, or even destroy it, as he might deem best for the whole public; 
and this without making or providing for any compensation to such 
individuals as might be inconvenienced or damaged thereby.40 
Factually, the case dealt with the rights of an owner of an island where the state has 
erected and maintained a bridge across a tidewater cove.41 However, the “[c]ourts 
are not in agreement as to what constitutes special injury sufficient to entitle the 
riparian owner to object.”42 This “special injury” concept seems similar to the 
nuisance concept relating to damages “different in kind” and degree, but the riparian 
rights cases do not appear to be based on nuisance theory.43 It seems that the courts 
may be using the concept loosely to do equity in certain cases, where navigation has 
a bearing on access, while skirting the basic premise such as the one stated in Frost, 
that a riparian owner, unable to show special injury, has no remedy other than as a 
member of the public.44 
The development of Florida law in this area began with Thiesen v. Gulf, Florida 
& Alabama Railway45 and Webb v. Giddens.46 According to the Thiesen court, the 
common-law riparian owner whose land extends to the high-water mark of tide 
waters has the right of ingress and egress to and from his land over the waters upon 
which his land bordered,47 and “the rights of a riparian owner at common law 
constitute[] property of which he [cannot] be deprived [by the state] without just 
compensation.”48 The case was “an action to recover damages for filling in from the 
shore line towards the channel opposite plaintiff’s land upon the waters of Pensacola 
Bay . . . .”49 The action was brought under an 1856 statute dealing with commerce 
and the construction of wharves and warehouses to facilitate the landing and storing 
of goods.50 Another main point of the case is that “[p]rivate ownership extends 
ordinarily to [the] high-water mark.”51   
 ________________________  
 40. Frost v. Wash. Cty. R.R., 51 A. 806, 809 (Me. 1901); see also Bailey v. Driscoll, 112 A.2d 3, 13 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div., 1955) (“[A] riparian owner has no rights at common law, except alluvion and dereliction, in 
such waters or the lands under them, beyond those of the public generally, even including unimpaired access thereto, 
merely by reason of his ownership of the ripa . . . .”).   
 41. Frost, 51 A. at 807.  
 42. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 100.    
 43. Id.  
 44. See, e.g., Frost, 51 A. at 809.  
 45. See Thiesen v. Gulf, Fla. & Ala. Ry., 78 So. 491, 500 (Fla. 1918) (holding that there exists a common-
law right of riparian ownership). 
 46. See Webb v. Giddens, 82 So. 2d 743, 745 (Fla. 1955) (discussing the scope of riparian rights).  
 47. Thiesen, 78 So. at 501.  
 48. Id. at 506. 
 49. Id. at 492.  
 50. Id. at 501. Thiesen seems to involve one of the old bulkhead type statutes that gave up the state’s 
ownership of submerged lands adjacent to riparian properties where riparian property owners filled in those 
submerged lands to build docks, wharves, and warehouses as long as they did not fill out into the channel itself. 
There were a number of these statutes that attempted to improve commerce but at the same time protect the public 
navigation in the channel.  
 51. Id. at 494 (citing Merrill-Stevens Co. v. Durkee, 57 So. 428, 558 (Fla. 1912); Ker & Co. v. Couden, 223 
U.S. 268, 179 (1912); United States v. Pacheco, 69 U.S. 587, 590 (1864)).  
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The owner of the lot also claimed common-law riparian rights of ingress and 
egress over the waters and “the right to bathe and fish in those waters.”52 On 
rehearing, the court reiterated the common-law principle that riparian lands are those 
“bounded by and extend[ing] to the high-water mark.”53 But with regard to the 
underlying beds, the court said, “[A]pplying the common law doctrine . . . the title 
to the soil under such waters to the high-water mark is in the state of Florida, subject 
to the powers of Congress to regulate commerce.”54 “[H]owever, [the title] is held in 
trust for the people who have the rights of navigating, fishing, bathing, and 
commerce upon and in the waters.”55    
Making a distinction between riparian rights that are exclusive to the riparian 
owner and those held in common with the public, the court stated:   
[T]he right of ingress and egress to and from the lot over the waters 
of the bay, . . . [is a] . . . common-law right appertaining to riparian 
proprietorship. The common-law riparian proprietor enjoys this 
right, and that of unobstructed view over the waters, and in common 
with the public the right of navigating, bathing, and fishing . . . .56   
The Thiesen court, quoting Ferry Pass Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n v. Whites 
River Inspectors’ & Shippers Ass’n, noted “the superior rights of the public as to 
navigation and commerce and the concurrent right[] of the [riparian owner] as to 
fishing and bathing.”57 The court in Thiesen also relied on Merrill-Stevens Co. v. 
 ________________________  
 52. Id. at 499.  
 53. Thiesen, 78 So. at 500.   
 54. Id. (citing Sullivan v. Moreno, 19 Fla. 200, 299 (1882); Broward v. Mabry, 50 So. 826, 829 (Fla. 1909)).  
 55. Id.; accord Marine One, Inc. v. Manatee Cty., 898 F.2d 1490, 1492 (11th Cir. 1990) (“The Florida 
Constitution provides: ‘The title to lands under navigable waters, within the boundaries of the state . . . is held by 
the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the people.’ Fla. Const. art. X § 11. Florida’s highest court 
recently termed it an ‘uncontroverted legal proposition’ that ‘Florida received title to all lands beneath navigable 
waters, up to the ordinary high water mark, as an incident of sovereignty, when it became a state in 1845.’ . . . Those 
proprietary powers are founded on the ‘public trust doctrine,’ long a part of Florida jurisprudence, even before article 
X, § 11 of the Florida Constitution was adopted.”); see also Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795, 799 (Fla. 1957); 
Brickell v. Trammell, 82 So. 221, 226 (Fla. 1919); Ferry Pass Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n v. Whites River 
Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n, 48 So. 643, 644 (Fla. 1909) (“The state by virtue of its sovereignty holds in trust for 
all the inhabitants of the state the title to the lands under the navigable waters within the state including the shore or 
space between [the] high and low water marks.”); Broward v. Mabry, 50 So. 826, 830 (Fla. 1909) (“Where a stream 
or body of water is permanent in character, and in its ordinary natural state is in fact navigable for useful purposes, 
and is of sufficient size and so situated and conditioned that it may be used for purposes common to the public in 
the locality where it is located, such water may be regarded as being of a public character, and the title to the land 
thereunder, including the shore or space between ordinary high and low water marks, when not included in the valid 
terms of a grant or conveyance to private ownership, is held by the state in its sovereign capacity in trust for the 
lawful uses of all the people of the state in the water and the land, subject to lawful governmental regulation of such 
uses. . . . Those who own land extending to ordinary high-water mark of navigable waters are riparian holders who, 
by implication of law, and in addition to the rights of navigation, commerce, fishing, boating, etc., common to the 
public, have in general certain special rights in the use of the waters opposite their holdings; among them being the 
right of access from the water to the riparian land and perhaps other easements allowed by law. These special rights 
are easements incident to the riparian holdings, and are property rights that may be regulated by law, but may not be 
taken without just compensation and due process of law.”).  
 56. Thiesen, 78 So. at 501.  
 57. Id. at 502 (emphasis added) (quoting Ferry Pass, 48 So. at 645 (“Subject to the superior rights of the 
public as to navigation and commerce, and to the concurrent rights of the public as to fishing and bathing and the 
like, a riparian owner may erect upon the bed and shores adjacent to his riparian holdings bath houses, wharves, or 
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Durkee,  for the proposition that “the owner of land abutting on navigable waters had 
no exclusive right in the waters below ordinary high-water mark or in the lands under 
the waters, except the right of access to and from the navigable waters, and rights in 
the land growing out of accretion or reliction.”58 The court in Thiesen discussed the 
nature of the riparian rights of view and access, concluding that they are property 
that cannot be taken for public use without compensation.59 
The fronting of a lot upon a navigable stream or bay often 
constitutes its chief value and desirability, whether for residence or 
business purposes. The right of access to the property over the 
waters, the unobstructed view of the bay, and the enjoyment of the 
privileges of the waters incident to ownership of the bordering land 
would not, in many cases, be exchanged for the price of an inland 
lot in the same vicinity. In many cases, doubtless, the riparian rights 
incident to the ownership of the land where the principal, if not the 
sole, inducement leading to its purchase by one and the reason for 
the price charge by the seller.60   
In that case, the court concluded that an “owner of land bounded by tidewater may 
maintain an action against a railroad corporation constructing its road [or railway] 
so as to cut off [] access to the water . . . .”61  
Webb v. Giddens was a case dealing with Lake Jackson, a navigable lake in Leon 
County, Florida.62 Giddens owned a parcel of land on an arm of the lake and had a 
business renting fishing boats.63 The arm was separated from the main part of the 
lake by a road, but a wooden state highway bridge left a passable waterway giving 
people in boats access to the main part of the lake.64 The state replaced the bridge 
with fill and a culvert that the court concluded did not provide a practical means of 
access.65 The lower court decreed that Giddens had a right of access to the main body 
of the lake for fishing, hunting, or boating.66 The Supreme Court of Florida began its 
analysis with the principle stated in Thiesen, that a riparian owner has the common 
law right of ingress and egress to and from the adjacent water.67 The Supreme Court 
of Florida in Webb held that the right of ingress and egress would be virtually 
 ________________________  
other structures to facilitate his business or pleasure; but these privileges are subject to the rights of the public to be 
enforced by proper authority or by individuals who are specially and unlawfully injured.”).  
 58. Thiesen, 78 So. at 503 (quoting Merrill-Stevens Co. v. Durkee, 57 So. 428, 431 (Fla. 1912)).  
 59. Id. at 507.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.; see also Rumsey v. N.Y. & New England R.R., 30 N.E. 654, 654–56 (N.Y. 1892) (involving plaintiffs 
who sought to recover damages after railroad cut off plaintiffs’ access to the river); Williams v. Mayor of New York, 
11 N.E. 829, 835 (N.Y. 1887) (finding that plaintiff should be compensated when his land and wharf rights are taken 
away or destroyed). 
 62. Webb v. Giddens, 82 So. 2d 743, 744 (Fla. 1955). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 745 (citing Thiesen v. Gulf, Fla. & Ala. Ry., 78 So. 491, 501 (Fla. 1918)). 
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meaningless if Giddens were not allowed access to the main body of the lake.68  On 
the other hand, the Third District Court of Appeal in Carmazi v. Board of County 
Commissioners found no encroachment on the property rights of riparian owners 
when the county constructed a dam on the Little River, thereby blocking the 
plaintiffs’ access to Biscayne Bay.69 The dam blocked the riparian owners’ access.70 
The court distinguished the right of the riparian landowner to launch a boat from his 
property into the immediately adjacent waters from the right to navigate.71 The court 
ruled that there is no private right to navigate on public waters.72 Rather, this is a 
public right that the plaintiffs acquired as members of the public and not due to any 
particular riparian status.73 Accordingly, when the public could no longer navigate 
on the Little River, the riparian owner lost his right to navigate as well.74  
Thus, Carmazi stands for the proposition that riparian owners do not have any 
rights to navigation other than those shared in common with the public.75 
Additionally, citing Thiesen, the court stated that bathing and fishing are also rights 
held in common with the public.76 In the words of the court:  
[A] right of navigation is a right common to the public in general. 
Riparian owners acquire no additional rights to navigation other 
than those shared concurrently with the public. . . . In the instant 
case, the appellants are complaining of the fact that once access is 
had to the water adjacent [to] their property, they cannot navigate to 
Biscayne Bay. This amounts to a deprivation of a right of navigation 
which will affect the public as a whole. The eminent domain statutes 
protect only private rights; not rights which accrue to the public as 
a whole.77   
However, relying on Thiesen, the Carmazi court acknowledged the exclusive 
riparian rights of ingress, egress, and unobstructed view.78   
Moreover, in Intracoastal North Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Palm Beach 
County, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that a condominium association’s 
 ________________________  
 68. Webb, 82 So. 2d at 745 (emphasis added). 
 69. Carmazi v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 108 So. 2d 318, 320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); see also Cent. & S. Fla. 
Flood Control Dist. v. Griffith, 119 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (relating to a similar issue on an artificial 
canal, i.e., the Biscayne Canal, and applying the principle stated in Carmazi and James v. Cent. & S. Fla. Flood 
Control Dist., 281 So. 2d 402 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)). 
 70. Carmazi, 108 So. 2d at 320. 
 71. See id. at 322 (ruling that whatever rights exist to citizens must yield to a necessary benefit to the public). 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. But see Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm’n v. Lake Islands, Ltd., 407 So. 2d 189, 193 (Fla. 1981) 
(“To the extent that Carmazi . . . conflicts with our decision in the instant case, it is disapproved.”).   
 76. Carmazi, 108 So. 2d at 323 (citing Thiesen v. Gulf, Fla. & Ala. Ry., 78 So. 491, 501 (Fla. 1918)). 
 77. Id. at 322–23; see also Silver Springs Paradise Co. v. Ray, 50 F.2d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 1931) (“In operating 
glass-bottom boats on the navigable waters of Silver Springs the appellees exercised, not a right which accrued to 
them by reason of their ownership of upland contiguous to those waters or of land beneath them, but the right of 
navigation which they possessed concurrently with the public generally.”). 
 78. Carmazi, 108 So. 2d at 323 (citing Thiesen, 78 So. at 501). 
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“riparian right of access was subject to the superior right of the public as to 
navigation and commerce . . . .”79 Both the trial court and district court of appeal 
quoted and relied on Ferry Pass for this proposition.80 Thus, while the Third District 
Court of Appeal in Carmazi considered the riparian right of navigation to be held in 
common with the rights of the public, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in 
Intracoastal said that the rights of the public to navigation are superior to those of 
the riparian owner.81   
On the other hand, the contrast between Webb and Carmazi makes for a 
somewhat challenging comparative analysis. The task is further complicated by 
Game & Freshwater Fish Commission v. Lake Islands, Ltd., discussed later in this 
section.82 However, the Carmazi court distinguished Webb as being “premised upon 
equitable grounds due to the unusual facts and circumstances existent in that case.”83 
Some of the “unusual facts and circumstances” referred to by the court in Webb were 
that the action of the state left the riparian owner without access to the main body of 
a navigable, landlocked body of water, thereby damaging his commercial enterprise 
of renting out boats.84 In Carmazi, on the other hand, the riparian owners apparently 
wanted to use the water for personal recreational purposes.85 If a significant 
distinction lies in the commercial vs. recreational characterization, then Carmazi 
arguably places the riparian owner wanting to partake of recreational uses in a 
weaker position than a counterpart who uses the navigable water for a commercial 
endeavor. 
Maloney provides the following analysis:  
The cases are not irreconcilable, however. To the extent that the 
Carmazi decision holds that a riparian owner does not have a private 
property right to travel over navigable waters, even those adjacent 
to his uplands, it is consistent with the position taken by many 
courts. And Webb v. Giddens does not say otherwise. What Webb v. 
Giddens does seem to say is that for travel over a navigable body of 
water to be materially obstructed by the state there must be an 
overriding public interest that justifies depriving either the public or 
the riparian of the enjoyment of this right. 
Webb v. Giddens also established that, whether such an obstruction 
is called a public nuisance from which the riparian owner sustains 
special injury, or whether it is called a private nuisance as to him, 
 ________________________  
 79. Intracoastal N. Condo. Ass’n v. Palm Beach Cty., 698 So. 2d 384, 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Carmazi, 108 So. 2d at 322; Intracoastal, 698 So. 2d at 385. 
 82. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm’n v. Lake Islands, Ltd., 407 So. 2d 189, 190 (Fla. 1981) (finding that 
a law prohibiting use of motorized boats in duck season was unreasonable as applied to owners of a navigable lake, 
and constitutional with regard to the general public). 
 83. Carmazi, 108 So. 2d at 323. 
 84. See Webb v. Giddens, 82 So. 2d 743, 744 (Fla. 1955). 
 85. See Carmazi, 108 So. 2d at 322 (discussing the asserted property right being “the right of passing by boat 
from [the riparian owner’s] property to nearby waters). 
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the riparian owner has the individual right to object and have the 
courts hear his objection.   
The conclusion in [Webb] was that replacing a bridge with a dirt fill 
was an unwarranted deprival of the right to navigate. In Carmazi, 
once the District Court of Appeal concluded that the plaintiff’s 
rights were merely public rights, it dealt with them summarily.86   
So it seems that a significant part of the analysis of these cases depends upon 
how a court distinguishes or intertwines access and navigation. For example, in 
Moore v. State Road Department,87 the First District Court of Appeal dealt with a 
situation where a bridge was to be built by the state just west of the plaintiff’s land.88 
The bridge would effectively cut off accessibility for large ships entering from the 
Gulf of Mexico.89 The plaintiff sought to enjoin construction of the bridge alleging 
it would impair the plaintiff’s riparian rights.90 The court pointed out the distinction 
between access and navigation: 
The point at which the rights of the riparian landowner as such end 
and the public rights of navigation begin is not always easy to 
determine, but it is the controlling factor in cases of this kind. The 
public right of navigation at a particular point may be restricted by 
a bridge or dam having a greater public value without invading the 
property rights of any citizen although the result may be substantial 
business losses to persons previously exercising the public right to 
use the waterway. But riparian property rights may not be taken 
without compensation.91 
The court concluded that the Carmazi rule applied and said that the plaintiffs 
maintained access to the channel in front of their uplands.92 Thus, only the right of 
navigation, which is shared with the public, was impaired.93 In reaching that 
decision, the court quoted and adopted the trial court’s opinion distinguishing the 
access issue of Webb from the navigation problem in Carmazi: 
The distinction between the two cases is that in the Webb case access 
to the main body of the waters was not preserved, and riparian rights 
were impaired, while in the Carmazi case access to the main body 
 ________________________  
 86. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 102. 
 87. Moore v. State Rd. Dep’t, 171 So. 2d 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 177 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 
1965). 
 88. See id. at 26. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 28. 
 92. Id. at 28–29.  
 93. Id. 
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of the river was not impaired, and the only rights infringed were 
rights of navigation.94 
The court’s decision may have been influenced by its finding that the bridge would 
leave clearance for all traffic moving on the inland waterway.95 Navigation was not 
actually blocked; only the large deep-sea ships would be denied access.96 “The 
theory of the plaintiffs’ case is that the construction of the new bridge will impair 
substantially the riparian rights incident to the plaintiffs’ ownership of the land lying 
between the old bridge and the new bridge.”97 The court determined that such a 
potential use was too remote to constitute a special injury that would entitle the 
plaintiff to relief.98   
The Supreme Court of Florida in Lake Islands, indicates that the riparian owner’s 
right of navigation is different from that of the public only where there is some 
special injury.99 This case further muddies the waters (so to speak) regarding riparian 
rights of navigation. But the facts and circumstances of the case make it 
distinguishable from other cases addressing this issue.100    
In Lake Islands, the Game and Freshwater Fish Commission (the 
“Commission”), acting pursuant to its statutory authority, enacted a rule “to 
absolutely prohibit the use of motor boats, including airboats, on the lake during 
duck hunting season.”101 There were some islands in Lake Iamonia (in Leon County, 
Florida), owned by Lake Islands, Ltd.102 Lake Islands, Ltd. sought permission from 
the Commission to use airboats on the lake to take prospective purchasers out to see 
the property.103 But the Commission denied that permission.104   
The trial court described the navigability of the lake as shallow with vegetation 
making navigation even more difficult.105 And even though boat paths had been cut 
by some persons using the lake, these paths did not provide access to some of the 
islands.106 The court noted that to access some of the islands, boats would have to be 
poled or airboats would be necessary.107 For some of the islands, where water levels 
were too low even for pole boats, an airboat would be the only means of access.108 
 ________________________  
 94. Moore, 171 So. 2d at 28. 
 95. Id. at 26.  
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. at 27.  
 98. See id. at 29 (holding that the plaintiffs’ “loss, if any, [was] damnum absque injuria.”). 
 99. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm’n v. Lake Islands, Ltd., 407 So. 2d 189, 192 (Fla. 1981). 
 100. Compare id. at 189–90, 193 (holding that island owners had no reasonable means of water navigation), 
with Moore v. State Rd. Dep’t, 171 So. 2d 25, 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (finding that property owners had a 
reasonable access to navigable waters). 
 101. Lake Islands, 407 So. 2d at 190. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. 
 107. Lake Islands, 407 So. 2d at 190. 
 108. Id. 
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The court noted that navigation of the lake had been made even more difficult by a 
drawdown of the lake by the Commission in 1977.109   
The trial court entered a final judgment requiring the Commission to issue 
permits to island owners for the reasonable use of motorboats and airboats on the 
lake during the hunting season.110 The Supreme Court of Florida in its discussion of 
the constitutional issues affirmed the trial court’s view that riparian owners have a 
right of access to their islands on a lake because this is their guaranteed right of 
ingress and egress which is a “well established common law right incident to 
ownership of property.”111  
The Supreme Court of Florida said, “We agree with this holding. Riparian rights 
under both common law and Florida [S]tatute include the right of ingress and 
egress,” citing as authority the Thiesen and Ferry Pass cases.112 There is dictum in 
the Ferry Pass case, and it is quoted in the Lake Islands case, regarding the right of 
riparian owners to have their water kept free from pollution, and the right to prevent 
obstruction to navigation or an unlawful use of the water or shore or bed that 
specially injures riparian owners.113 As previously noted, the Ferry Pass case says 
that “the injury must relate to [the] riparian lands or business conducted thereon and 
not to business conducted on the waters by virtue only of the right of navigation.”114 
This implies a special injury requirement for riparian owners to have a separate cause 
of action.115 Also, there is language in the case about “the rights of the public to be 
enforced by proper public authority or by individuals who are specially and 
unlawfully injured. . . . [and that] [r]iparian owners have no exclusive rights to 
navigation in or commerce upon a navigable stream opposite the riparian holdings . 
. . .”116 And there is language in the Ferry Pass case that says “[A]s to mere 
navigation in and commerce upon the public waters, riparian owners as such have 
no rights superior to other inhabitants of the State.”117 Yet, once again in dictum, 
Ferry Pass declares an undefined right to have water kept free from pollution, even 
though the court does not cite any specific authority for that proposition nor was such 
a statement essential to the court’s decision in the case.118 
The Lake Islands court stated, “It is a recognized general rule of law that a 
riparian owner’s interest in waterway navigation is the same as a member of the 
public except where there is some special injury to the riparian owner.”119 Then the 
 ________________________  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 191, 193.  
 112. Id. at 191 (citing Thiesen v. Gulf, Fla. & Ala. Ry., 78 So. 491, 491 (Fla. 1918)).  
 113. Lake Islands, 407 So. 2d at 191.  
 114. Ferry Pass Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n v. White’s River Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n, 48 So. 643, 
645 (Fla. 1909). 
 115. See id. (“A riparian owner has a right to enjoin in a proper proceeding the unlawful use of the public 
waters or the land thereunder including the shore which is part of the bed, when such unlawful use operates as a 
special injury to such riparian owner in the use and enjoyment of his riparian lands.”). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. 
 119. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm’n v. Lake Islands, Ltd., 407 So. 2d 189, 192 (Fla. 1981).  
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Lake Islands court discussed Webb, a case that was distinguished in Carmazi.120 The 
Lake Islands court elaborated on its interpretation of the decision in Webb, in that 
the issue in Webb was whether there was a denial of ingress and egress “which 
deprived the owner of ‘a practical incident of his riparian proprietorship.’”121 The 
court concluded that in Webb, the rights of ingress and egress would be virtually 
meaningless unless the plaintiffs were allowed access to the main body of the lake.122 
The Lake Islands court was focused on the plaintiffs’ access to their property, 
apparently considering denial of reasonable access to constitute a special injury that 
is actionable by the riparian owner.123 At this point, the court adds ambiguity to the 
analysis by saying “[t]o the extent that [Carmazi v. Board of County Commissioners] 
conflicts with our decision in the instant case, it is disapproved.”124 The court in Lake 
Islands is not clear as to what part of Carmazi is disapproved.125 Presumably, the 
court is acknowledging the special injury exception.126 Perhaps the court is saying 
that where the rights of navigation throughout the entire water body have a bearing 
on whether or not riparian owners have meaningful access to their property from the 
water, the court is qualifying the Carmazi decision. The Carmazi decision stands for 
the proposition (substantiated by Thiesen) that as long as one has access to and from 
riparian property via the water, if navigation upon those waters is in some way 
limited, then the riparian owner is not in a position superior to the public at large to 
complain about it.127 
In his dissent in Lake Islands, Chief Justice Sundberg concludes:  
[O]nce the majority finds the act and regulation in the instant case a 
reasonable exercise of the police power over navigation insofar as 
the general public is concerned, it must be found reasonable as to 
the island owners because they enjoy no greater rights to navigation 
on the lake than does the public in general. I would reverse the 
judgment of the trial court.128   
 ________________________  
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. at 192, 193 (“For the riparian right of ingress and egress to mean anything, it must at the very least 
establish a protectable interest when there is a special injury. To hold otherwise means the state could absolutely 
deny reasonable access to an island property owner or block off both ends of a channel without being responsible to 
the riparian owner for any compensation. A waterway is often the street or public way; when one denies its use to a 
property owner, one denies him access to his property. This is particularly so in the case of island property. As stated 
[by] F. Maloney, . . . ‘What good is access to a thirty-foot-deep channel a hundred yards or so long and blocked at 
both ends?’ Reasonable access must, of course, be balanced with the public good, but a substantial diminution or 
total denial of reasonable access to the property owner is a compensable . . . deprivation of a property interest.”) 
(citation omitted).  
 124. Id. at 193. 
 125. Lake Islands, 407 So. 2d at 193.  
 126. Id.; see also Bertram v. State Rd. Dep’t., 118 So. 2d 674 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).   
 127. Thiesen v. Gulf, Fla. & Ala. Ry., 78 So. 491, 501 (Fla. 1918); Carmazi v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 108 So. 
2d 318, 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
 128. Lake Islands, 407 So. 2d at 197. 
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In Krieter v. Chiles, a riparian owner sued, challenging the state’s denial of 
permission to construct a dock on sovereign submerged lands.129 In affirming the 
denial of permission, the court qualified the riparian right of access.130 The Third 
District Court of Appeal held that a riparian owner did not have a right of access to 
the property from the water if the landowner had access to her property by way of a 
road adjacent to the property.131 It is interesting to note that while the plaintiff in 
Krieter sought access to the water, the court decided the case based on access to the 
land.132  
Thus, to summarize this portion of the analysis, the general rule to be gleaned 
from the cases is that a riparian owner has a unique right of access to the navigable 
waters adjacent to his property.133 But he shares the right of navigation with the 
public.134 Loss of the ability to navigate (or to go boating) is not compensable in the 
absence of special circumstances.135 And indirectly, a right to navigate on the waters 
may be upheld if it is the only means of access to the riparian property.136   
B. Fishing and Swimming 
The public has the right to boat, fish, and bathe in the navigable waters of the 
state.137 Yet case law also categorizes fishing and swimming as riparian rights, and 
a Florida statute has defined fishing and swimming as riparian rights.138 However, 
the rights of the public and those of riparian owners in the waters themselves are 
generally indistinguishable and sometimes are described as rights held in common 
with the public.139     
The critical questions are whether or not a riparian owner holds any rights to 
such uses beyond those held by the general public, and if so, whether such additional 
rights would give the riparian owner a cause of action distinct from that of any other 
member of the public. The Florida cases that discuss the intersection of riparian and 
public rights have dealt primarily with the relationship between the right of ingress 
 ________________________  
 129. Krieter v. Chiles, 595 So. 2d 111, 112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 113 (“The appellant does not have the right to wharf out for purposes of ingress and egress. Ingress 
and egress is available from the property by land-based routes. Only in the absence of this modern-day alternative 
could the appellant argue a necessity of ingress and egress. In the absence of such a necessity, the appellant’s riparian 
rights are subject to the public’s interests.”) (emphasis added). 
 132. Id. at 112. 
 133. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 98. But see Krieter, 595 So. 2d at 112 
(“The appellant’s upland property carries with it certain riparian rights. . . . Although the riparian right of ingress 
and egress is an appurtenance to the ownership of private upland property, . . . it is a qualified right which must give 
way to the rights of the state’s people.”) (citations omitted). 
 134. Webb v. Giddens, 82 So. 2d 743, 745 (Fla. 1955) (quoting Thiesen v. Gulf, Fla. & Ala. Ry., 78 So. 491, 
501 (Fla. 1918)). 
 135. Game and Fresh Water Fish Comm’n v. Lake Islands, Ltd., 407 So. 2d 189, 192 (Fla. 1981). 
 136. Id. at 189; see also Krieter, 595 So. 2d at 111. 
 137. Brickell v. Trammell, 82 So. 221, 227 (Fla. 1919); MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 
supra note 4, at 32.  
 138. FLA. STAT. § 253.141(1) (2016). 
 139. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 98–99 (citing Brickell, 82 So. at 227; 
Ferry Pass Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n v. White’s River Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n, 48 So. 643 (Fla. 1909)); 
see Adams v. Elliott, 174 So. 731, 733 (Fla. 1937). 
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and egress and the public right of boating and navigation.140 Accordingly, it is 
necessary to extrapolate from these cases their application, if any, to injury from a 
wastewater spill or water pollution. While that should be part of the analysis, it is 
also important to look to the early source of the various riparian rights. Even though 
the courts seem to group the rights of boating, fishing, and swimming and say that 
they are held in common with the public, the origins of each of them are different, 
and a brief historical analysis may help in determining riparian rights relative to 
public rights.141 
1. Fishing 
The English common law did not provide a riparian right to fish for the owner 
of upland adjacent to navigable waters.142 In fact, exclusive fishing rights belonged 
to the owner of the bed underlying the water, and “[t]he English rule has received 
varied treatment at the hands of the American courts, although most of the courts 
seem to follow it, at least verbally.”143 Yet the English rule does not normally apply 
when the beds under the navigable waters are held by the state in trust for the people, 
as they are in Florida.144 In that situation, the right of a riparian owner to fish is not 
considered exclusive and either must be attributable to ownership of land bordering 
a navigable water body or being a member of the public where there is a public right 
to fish.145   
Additionally, private ownership of submerged lands may confuse the riparian 
rights issue with regard to potential conflict between the rights of riparian owners in 
contrast to those of the public, rather than the issue of whether there is a separate, 
private riparian right to fish.146 However, “[b]ecause of its English origins, the right 
to fish is associated with ownership of the underlying land.”147 Thus, if a riparian 
owner did happen to own some of the submerged lands, he might have a private 
riparian right to fish but not because of his status as a riparian owner of upland 
abutting the water.148 Rather, the right to fish would arise as a property right 
associated with ownership of the underlying submerged lands.149 Accordingly, this 
discussion contradicts a rule of law that a riparian owner has special fishing rights 
that arise from ownership of the adjacent upland.150 The contrary appears to be true. 
The right to fish arises out of ownership of the submerged lands.151 If the state owns 
 ________________________  
 140. See, e.g., Carmazi v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 108 So. 2d 318, 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
 141. “Fishing and swimming are often described in the case law as riparian rights and are so defined in a 
Florida statute. Historically, however, the law has generally made these pleasures as much available to nonriparians 
as to riparian owners.” MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 108 (citations omitted).   
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 109. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id.  
 147. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 109.      
 148. Id.  
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. at 110.  
 151. See Ferry Pass Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n v. White’s River Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n, 48 So. 
643, 645 (Fla. 1909). 
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the land under navigable waters, which is generally the case in Florida,152 then 
fishing is a public right that the riparian owner shares with the public and the only 
aspect of it that is unique to the riparian owner is that he has access from his property 
while members of the public must find a point of public access.153   
Regardless of which of these views is followed in Florida, the result would seem 
to be the same from the standpoint of the riparian owner vs. the public.154 That is, 
fishing is a public right based on either the state’s ownership of the submerged lands 
or the navigational servitude.155 The riparian owner merely shares the public fishing 
rights and has only a unique point of access from his property.156 
2. Swimming 
With regard to the right to swim in navigable waters, the riparian right does not 
stem from the same historical foundation as the right to fish.157 While the courts 
frequently mention a riparian right to swim in the context of upland ownership, these 
comments by the courts are generally dicta.158 Yet the Florida statute that defines 
riparian rights specifically mentions “bathing” (swimming) as one of those rights 
that accompany ownership of land bordered by navigable waters.159 However, the 
statute specifically says that these rights are not of a proprietary nature.160 The 
limited cases that have addressed the riparian right to swim have generally involved 
governmental attempts to restrict the use of the waters in order to protect a public 
water supply.161 The cases have turned on whether the court viewed the government 
action as limiting a public use or an attempt to restrict the riparian owner.162 Limiting 
a public use would give government wide latitude.163 However, since the Supreme 
Court of Florida has repeatedly stated that riparian rights are property rights, a 
 ________________________  
 152. See MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 111 (noting that under English law, 
the Crown owned the land under water and how “Most American courts apply the same rule to nontidal bodies.”). 
 153. See id. at 111–12 (“The Florida Supreme Court has recognized the existence of a right in the public to 
fish in navigable lakes and rivers. It has not, however, determined whether this right exists as an incident of 
navigation or as a separate right stemming from the trust under which the state holds title to lands under navigable 
waters, although there is early dictum indicating that the sovereignty lands trust is the basis. Anchoring the public 
fishing right to the trust theory seems reasonable, since historically fishing has been a major use of Florida waters. 
A trust for the benefit of the public to use the water would be anomalous without including such an established use. 
Indeed, the more widely accepted theory in other jurisdictions is that fishing rights inhere in the public because the 
state holds title to the underlying land in trust for the people. The common right of fishing is incident to such 
ownership, and the navigation right is a right of passage merely. Under this view, in those jurisdictions in which 
land underlying navigable waters may be held in private ownership, it is the private owners, and not the public, who 
have the right to fish in the waters. . . . A few states consider the public right to fish to be an incident to the right to 
navigate upon the waters. Fishing rights so established are independent of the ownership of the submerged bottom, 
and are entirely a function of navigability and the resulting public easement.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 154. Ferry Pass, 48 So. at 644–45. 
 155. Id.; MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 111. 
 156. See Ferry Pass, 48 So. at 645. 
 157. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 110. 
 158. Id. 
 159. FLA. STAT. § 253.141(1) (2016). 
 160. Id. 
 161. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 111; see, e.g., Pounds v. Darling, 77 
So. 666 (Fla. 1918). 
 162. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 110; see Pounds, 77 So. at 669. 
 163. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 110; see Pounds, 77 So. at 669. 
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restriction on the riparian owner’s use of adjacent waters without compensation may 
result in an unconstitutional taking.164 
Thus, in situations where a public entity attempts to take the water for a public 
purpose and deprive the riparian owner of the ability to swim in the waters for public 
health reasons, riparian rights seem to possess more of a proprietary element.165 
Aside from that type of situation, the analysis of the riparian right to swim may be 
similar to that of fishing.166 That is, the right is a public right and the riparian owner 
merely shares in it.167 He does not have a separate or distinct right to swim, only the 
unique point of access from his property.168 
C. Additional Riparian Rights that “may be or have been defined by law”  
In addition to confusing the issue of whether riparian rights are a form of 
property, section 253.141(1), Florida Statutes, lends vagueness to the analysis after 
listing the riparian rights of ingress, egress, boating, bathing, and fishing by adding 
“and such others as may be or have been defined by law.”169   
Considering this vague catch-all phrase of the statute, one may question whether 
this language implies a riparian right to have the water maintained at a certain quality 
level.170 It does not appear that such a right has been clearly defined by Florida law 
but has surfaced as dicta in some of the cases.171 For example, the Ferry Pass case 
does provide a foothold for an argument that such a right exists.172 However, the 
court’s statement in this regard is dictum.173  Furthermore, one significant challenge 
in defining such a right would be to differentiate it from the general public’s right. 
In the Ferry Pass case, distinguishing the “right to have water free from pollution” 
language as dictum leads to a conclusion that only “special injury” would enable a 
private cause of action.174 This position is based on the premise that, because some 
riparian rights are held in common with the public, a public right subsumes all private 
riparian owner injuries except where a riparian owner can show special injury.175   
In Ferry Pass, the plaintiff owned lands fronting on a navigable river and was 
engaged in the business of inspecting timber and logs and shipping timber.176 The 
plaintiff would use long stretches of the river for the handling, inspecting, and 
 ________________________  
 164. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 110; see Pounds, 77 So. at 669. 
 165. See MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 110. 
 166. Id. at 110–11; Ferry Pass Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n v. White’s River Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n, 
48 So. 643, 645 (Fla. 1909). 
 167. See MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 110–11; Ferry Pass, 48 So. at 645. 
 168. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 111–12; Ferry Pass, 48 So. at 645. 
 169. FLA. STAT. § 253.141(1) (2016).  
 170. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 322 (regarding the Reasonable Use 
Rule). 
 171. See, e.g., Ferry Pass, 48 So. at 645; see also Mildenberger v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 217, 246 (Fed. 
Cl. 2010). 
 172. Ferry Pass, 48 So. 645.  
 173. See id.; Mildenberger, 91 Fed. Cl. at 246. 
 174. Ferry Pass, 48 So. at 645. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 644.   
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shipping procedure.177 The defendant was engaged in a similar business and had 
dominated the river with its own inspection and shipping of logs and timber, thus, 
depriving the plaintiff access to, and use of, the river for conducting its business.178 
While the court only needed to decide the respective rights of the parties as to access, 
navigation, and commerce on the river, it expounded at length on the scope of 
riparian rights, and included among riparian rights “the right to have the water kept 
free from pollution.”179 While the court acknowledged that the riparian owner’s right 
of access from his property to the navigable waters may be exclusive, the court said 
that the riparian owner does not have a right superior to the public with regard to 
navigation in and commerce upon public waters.180 The Ferry Pass court opined that 
those rights are concurrent with other inhabitants of the state.181 Yet the opinion 
offers a qualifying comment on the concept of “special injury.” The court stated that 
a 
riparian owner has a right to enjoin in a proper proceeding the 
unlawful use of the public waters or the land thereunder including 
the shore which is a part of the bed, when such unlawful use operates 
as a special injury to such riparian owner in the use and enjoyment 
of his riparian lands.182   
And unless a statute were to provide otherwise, in order to show special injury the 
riparian owner must demonstrate impact to riparian lands or a business conducted by 
the riparian owner on his property, and not to a business that the riparian owner 
conducts on the waters pursuant to only the right of navigation.183 Tying together the 
right to have the water kept free from pollution (albeit in dictum) with the concept 
 ________________________  
 177. Id.  
 178. Id.   
 179. See id. at 644–45 (emphasis added) (“Among the common-law rights of those who own land bordering 
on navigable waters, apart from rights of alluvion and dereliction are the right of access to the water from the land 
for navigation and other purposes expressed or implied by law, the right to a reasonable use of the water for domestic 
purposes, the right to the flow of the water without serious interruption by upper or lower riparian owners or others, 
the right to have the water kept free from pollution, the right to protect the abutting property from trespass and from 
injury by the improper use of the water for navigation or other purposes, the right to prevent obstruction to navigation 
or an unlawful use of the water or of the shore or bed that specially injures the riparian owner in the use of his 
property, the right to use the water in common with the public for navigation, fishing, and other purposes in which 
the public has an interest. Subject to the superior rights of the public as to navigation and commerce, and to the 
concurrent rights of the public as to fishing and bathing and the like, a riparian owner may erect upon the bed and 
shores adjacent to his riparian holdings, bath houses, wharves, or other structures to facilitate his business or 
pleasure; but these privileges are subject to the rights of the public to be enforced by proper public authority or by 
individuals who are specially and unlawfully injured. Riparian owners have no exclusive right to navigation in or 
commerce upon a navigable stream opposite the riparian holdings, and have no right to so use the water or land 
under it as to obstruct or unreasonably impede lawful navigation and commerce by others, or so as to unlawfully 
burden or monopolize navigation or commerce. The exclusive rights of a riparian owner are such as are necessary 
for the use and enjoyment of his abutting property and the business lawfully conducted thereon; and these rights 
may not be so exercised as to injure others in their lawful rights.”) (emphasis added). Although the Supreme Court 
of Florida cited to mostly other jurisdictions outside of Florida, it did cite to the Florida case of State v. Black River 
Phosphate Co., 13 So. 640 (Fla. 1893). 
 180. Ferry Pass, 48 So. at 644–45.    
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at 645 (emphasis added). 
 183. Id.  
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of “special injury” presents an issue as to whether the court would have viewed 
pollution as a form of special injury.184 However, since the public would also likely 
suffer the same injury from pollution, presumably the court would require the 
riparian owner to show special injury to the use and enjoyment of his riparian lands 
or to a business conducted on the property beyond merely pollution of adjacent 
waters.185    
The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that if the defendant used the water, 
submerged lands, or shore to deprive the plaintiff of all access to the river from its 
lands, or injured the plaintiff “in the use and enjoyment of his riparian land or the 
business thereon, the defendant may be enjoined from a continuance of such wrong; 
but the complainant has no exclusive right to use the waters or shore for its 
business.”186 However, the court continued, if only navigation is obstructed then the 
proper parties to bring an action are public officials.187 
Perhaps some perspective can be gleaned from the reasonable use rule.188 The 
reasonable use rule evolved from the natural flow doctrine.189 Under the latter 
concept, the riparian owner has no right to change the natural conditions or 
characteristics of navigable waters.190 However, “[t]he reasonable use rule . . . grants 
. . . the lower riparian [owner] only the right to have his water kept free from 
unreasonable interference.”191 And case law supports the proposition that pollution 
is an unreasonable interference.192 In Tampa Waterworks v. Cline, the Supreme 
Court of Florida said that the upper riparian owner in making use of his land cannot 
“divert or pollute the stream that flows through the land.”193  
In Florida Water Law, the authors stated that “Riparian owners are endowed 
with special status to abate water pollution in adjacent waters, such status being 
sufficient in and of itself to meet the special injury requirement.”194 Plaintiffs 
alleging a special type of pecuniary damage have also been found to meet the special 
injury rule.195 For example, Harrell v. Hess Oil & Chemical Corp. was a class action 
 ________________________  
 184. See id.  
 185. Id. at 645 (applying the requirement of a riparian owner to show the riparian owner suffered a special 
injury from the unlawful use of public waters to a riparian owner suffering injury to his riparian rights from water 
pollution). 
 186. Ferry Pass, 48 So. at 646. 
 187. Id. (emphasis added); see also Page v. Niagara Chem. Div. of Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 68 So. 2d 
382, 384 (Fla. 1953) (stating that public rights must be redressed by the state). 
 188. See MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 322–23. 
 189. Id. at 322. 
 190. Id.  
 191. Id.; see also Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 20 So. 780, 782 (Fla. 1896).  
 192. Tampa Waterworks, 20 So. at 786. 
 193. Id. (emphasis added).   
 194. FRANK E. MALONEY ET. AL., FLORIDA WATER LAW 481 (1980) (citing Harrell v. Hess Oil & Chem. 
Corp., 287 So. 2d 291, 293, 295 (Fla. 1973) (stating that the riparian owner is not limited to public officials seeking 
relief from water pollution); Nat’l Container Corp. v. State, 189 So. 4, 13–14 (Fla. 1939) (stating that riparians need 
not show special damage in suit to abate water pollution); Wetzel v. Duda & Sons, 306 So. 2d 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1975) (stating that riparians on lake had standing to abate nuisance); Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Tr. 
Fund v. Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (stating that obstruction of 
the riparian right of access is considered a special injury)).  
 195. See Skaggs-Albertson’s v. ABC Liquors, Inc., 363 So. 2d 1082, 1086–87, 1091 (Fla. 1978); Keating v. 
State, 173 So. 2d 673, 675 (Fla. 1965).  
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seeking damages for an alleged discharge of sand and silt into a navigable creek.196 
The named plaintiffs were riparian owners along the waterway asserting a class 
action on behalf of all the owners along the creek.197 The court ruled that a class 
action had not been properly pled but that the complaint did state an individual cause 
of action.198 While the case does not specify the exact nature of the plaintiffs’ 
damages, it does say “that their riparian rights have been adversely affected by 
respondents’ acts” and that “petitioners claim injury to their riparian rights sufficient 
to support a claim for individual relief.”199 The “special status” discussion in Florida 
Water Law was in a section on nuisance actions.200 However, Webb and Lake Islands, 
the “special status” or “special injury” cases discussed earlier relating to navigation, 
etc., were not necessarily brought under nuisance theories, but the courts seemed to 
imbue riparian owners with some kind of special status if they could find no other 
way to bring about an equitable result.201  
Harbor Beach Surf Club, Inc. v. Water Taxi of Ft. Lauderdale, Inc.202 is an 
example of a case where there was obstruction to navigation, an action in nuisance, 
and special injury shown.203 There, the court reiterated the general rule of Ferry Pass: 
[W]e admit the outcome of this case may appear inequitable as 
against Harbor Beach. However, the result is not inequitable with 
reference to the well-recognized rule that a riparian owner’s right to 
use navigable waters and the lands thereunder is concurrent with 
that of the public, not superior to that of the public.204  
Harbor Beach was a riparian owner, but it is not clear whether Water Taxi had 
any riparian status.205 Water Taxi was, as the name implies, a water taxi service that 
was being hampered in transporting passengers to a hotel by a footbridge that had 
been built by Harbor Beach.206 The court focused on the economic harm to business 
to conclude that there was a special injury different from the public to confer standing 
in this nuisance action.207    
 ________________________  
 196. Harrell, 287 So. 2d at 293. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 294, 295. 
 199. Id. at 295; see also Conrad v. Whitney, 141 So. 2d 796, 798, 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (finding that 
riparian owners whose use of bayou waters had been limited and whose access across the bayou to Sarasota Bay had 
been blocked were entitled to mandatory injunction requiring defendants to remove the fill that they had placed 
across the bayou); Duval v. Thomas, 107 So. 2d 148, 149, 151, 152–53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (establishing the 
principle that the owner of a portion of the bed of a non-navigable landlocked lake does not have the right to exercise 
exclusive dominion and control over that portion of the bed and the waters of the lake that he owns). 
 200. MALONEY, FLORIDA WATER LAW, supra note 193, at 481. 
 201. See Webb v. Giddens, 82 So. 2d 743, 745 (Fla. 1955); Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm’n v. Lake 
Islands, Ltd., 407 So. 2d 189, 191, 192, 193 (Fla. 1981).  
 202. Harbor Beach Surf Club, Inc. v. Water Taxi of Ft. Lauderdale, Inc.,711 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1998). 
 203. Id. at 1231. 
 204. Id. at 1233–34; see also Ferry Pass Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n v. White’s River Inspectors’ & 
Shippers’ Ass’n, 48 So. 643, 645 (Fla. 1909).  
 205. See Harbor Beach Surf Club, 711 So. 2d. at 1231. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 1232–33. 
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In Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Medeira Beach 
Nominee, Inc., the court posed the question, “Does a strip of accreted land become 
the property of the upland riparian owner even where the accretion is the result of a 
lawful exercise of the police power by a municipality to prevent beach erosion?” 208 
One of the reasons the court touched on as the basis for the doctrine of accretion is 
to preserve the riparian owner’s access to the water.209 As part of its analysis, the 
court, mostly in dicta elaborated on riparian rights, saying that the status of riparian 
owners entitles them to greater rights than the public.210 But the court only mentions 
this in regard to riparian owners’ exclusive right of access over their property to the 
water and to an unobstructed view.211 Moreover, the court, citing Webb v. Giddens,212 
opined, “The riparian owner suffers special injury when a nuisance obstructs his right 
to navigation.”213 Yet the court offered little explanation other than to make a broad 
statement that the “impact of governmental regulation on the rights to swim and fish 
may be greater on the riparian than on the public. Thus, a police power regulation 
prohibiting swimming, fishing, or boating may be unchallengeable by the public but 
constitute a taking with respect to a riparian.”214  
Yet in Brickell v. Trammell, the Supreme Court of Florida seems to distinguish 
the riparian rights in common with the public from those that are “special.”215 The 
court, citing Ferry Pass, said that the rights of “navigation, commerce, fishing, 
boating, etc.” are held in common with the public.216 Yet riparian owners have 
“certain special rights in the use of the waters opposite their holdings, among them 
being the right of access from the water to the riparian land and such other rights as 
are allowed by law.”217 And the court opined that “[t]hese special rights are 
easements incident to the riparian holdings . . . .”218 While these rights may be 
regulated, they “may not be taken without just compensation and due process of 
law.”219 
On the other hand, in Bair v. Central & Southern Florida Flood Control District,  
the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against the predecessor to the South Florida 
Water Management District.220 In Bair, the Supreme Court of Florida did not find 
facts sufficient to support an action in either public or private nuisance, stating that 
“there is no showing of injury or damage of the essential character different from 
that which might be suffered by the populace generally.”221 
 ________________________  
 208. Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1973). 
 209. Id. at 212–13. 
 210. Id. at 214. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Webb v. Giddens, 82 So.2d 743 (Fla.1955).  
 213. Medeira, 272 So. 2d at 214. 
 214. Id. (citing Richardson v. Beattie, 95 A.2d 122 (N.H. 1953); People v. Hulbert, 91 N.W. 211 (Mich. 
1902)). 
 215. Brickell v. Trammel, 82 So. 221, 227 (Fla. 1919). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Bair v. Cent. & S. Fla. Flood Control Dist., 144 So. 2d 818, 819 (Fla. 1962). 
 221. Id. at 820–21. 
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Maloney discusses the confusion and how the Restatement of Torts, Second, 
attempts to address the situation: 
Because of the similarity between nuisance theory and the 
“reasonable use” theory of riparian rights, the Restatement of Torts, 
Second, has adopted a modified approach towards pollution cases, 
whereby such injuries are considered under nuisance theory instead 
of the law of riparian rights. This approach was taken to avoid 
confusion in the law and provide greater protection to plaintiffs 
suffering from pollution related injuries. Under riparian doctrine, the 
tendency of the courts is to consider reasonable, beneficial uses of 
water as a property right incident to ownership of the riparian land. 
Beneficial uses of water which cause pollution might then acquire 
the status of a property right under [the] riparian doctrine. Pollution 
cases were therefore classified under nuisance law to emphasize 
“that pollution is a tort and not the exercise of a property right.” 
Riparian law is still applied regarding disputes affecting the quantity 
of water to be allocated between riparian uses.222 
So it seems that the Restatement tends to negate the position that there is some kind 
of riparian property right that would entitle the riparian owner to damages as a result 
of pollution. In fact, most of the cases were brought for injunctive relief to abate 
pollution.223 Another distinguishing factor is that, as in Tampa Waterworks, the cases 
primarily involved actual or threatened damage to consumptive uses.224 Florida 
Water Law alludes to this in the last sentence of the quoted language.225 
Additionally, in Florida Water Law there is discussion of Cities Service Co. v. 
State.226 In that case, the operators of a phosphate mine were held liable for water 
pollution caused by a break in an earthen dam that impounded phosphate slime.227 
 ________________________  
 222. MALONEY ET. AL., FLORIDA WATER LAW, supra note 210, at 333 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 849(1)(a)-(c)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 849(c)(2) (“The pollution of water by a 
riparian proprietor that creates a nuisance by causing harm to another person’s interest in land or water is not the 
exercise of a riparian right.”). 
 223. MALONEY ET. AL., FLORIDA WATER LAW, supra note 210, at 331 (citing Parsons v. Tenn. Coal, Iron, & 
R.R., 64 So. 591 (Ala. 1914) (affirming denial of damages because no substantial injury shown from pollution from 
defendant’s coal mining operation); Clark v. Lindsay Light & Chem. Co., 93 N.E.2d 441, 443 (Ill. App. Ct. 1950) 
(denying injunction against pollution because damages shown were only nominal); Panther Coal Co. v. Looney, 40 
S.E.2d 298, 300–04 (Va. 1946) (finding that defendant company did not have a legal right to pollute the plaintiff 
landowner’s water in a material and substantial way even if that pollution was caused by the non-negligent, lawful 
operation of its mining business, but the landowner was awarded no damages because he had failed to prove that the 
damage to his water was due more to the actions of the company than to his own pollution of that water)); see also 
Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 20 So. 780 (Fla. 1896). 
 224. MALONEY ET. AL., FLORIDA WATER LAW, supra note 210, at 333 (citing Parsons, 64 So. 591; Clark, 93 
N.E.2d at 442; Panther Coal, 40 S.E.2d at 302–03); see also Tampa Waterworks, 20 So. at 782, 785, 786. 
 225. MALONEY ET. AL., FLORIDA WATER LAW, supra note 210, at 333 (“Riparian law is still applied regarding 
disputes affecting the quantity of water to be allocated between riparian uses.”).  
 226. Id. at 334 (citing Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)). 
 227. Cities Serv., 312 So. 2d at 800, 803–04. 
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The court invoked the doctrine of strict liability.228 However, the state, not riparian 
owners, brought this action.229 
At this juncture, it is not clear whether the doctrines of reasonable use, special 
status, and strict liability are, or create, additional riparian rights that “may be or have 
been defined by law” as contemplated by: (1) section 253.141, Florida Statutes; (2) 
its predecessor legislation; or (3) even the common law.230 But it seems that these 
theories relate more to the remedy of removing the pollution or nuisance rather than 
an award of money damages. In some cases, nature may attenuate the pollution and 
accomplish remediation rather quickly. 
CONCLUSION 
One thing is clear, there is a great deal of dicta and confusion concerning riparian 
rights, especially regarding the question of whether a riparian owner has rights that 
are superior to the public regarding adjacent navigable waters. While the Florida 
courts have not definitively answered this question as to fishing and swimming, the 
body of current Florida water law strongly supports an argument that a riparian 
owner has no right superior to that of any member of the public to use the water for 
navigation or boating.231 By analogy, the same should hold true for fishing or 
swimming. For example, fishing is a public right based on either the state’s 
ownership of the submerged lands or the navigational servitude.232 The riparian 
owner merely shares the public fishing rights and has only a unique point of access 
from his property.233 The riparian right to swim arguably is similar to that of fishing; 
that is, the right is a public right and the riparian owner merely shares in it.234 The 
riparian owner does not have a separate or distinct right to swim, only the unique 
point of access from the riparian property.235 However, the right to have water kept 
free of pollution, loosely expressed by some courts, is not as clear.236   
 ________________________  
 228. Id. at 803. 
 229. Id. at 800. 
 230. FLA. STAT. § 253.141 (1) (2016). 
 231. See MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 100; Ferry Pass Inspectors’ & 
Shippers’ Ass’n v. White’s River Inspectors’ & Shippers’ Ass’n, 48 So. 643, 644 (Fla. 1909) (“The State by virtue 
of its sovereignty holds in trust for all the inhabitants of the State the title to the lands under the navigable waters 
within the State, including the shore or space between high and low water marks.”); Broward v. Mabry, 50 So. 826, 
830 (Fla. 1909) (finding that rights of navigation, commerce, fishing, and boating are common to the public); 
Carmazi v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 108 So. 2d 318, 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (“[A] right of navigation is a right 
common to the public in general. Riparian owners acquire no additional rights to navigation other than those shared 
concurrently with the public.”). 
 232. MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 111. 
 233. Ferry Pass, 48 So. at 645. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id.; see also Harrell v. Hess Oil & Chem. Corp., 287 So. 2d 291, 293, 295 (Fla. 1973) (stating that the 
riparian owner is not limited to public officials seeking relief from water pollution); Nat’l Container Corp. v. State, 
189 So. 4, 5, 13–14 (Fla. 1939) (stating that riparians need not show special damage in suit to abate water pollution); 
Wetzel v. Duda & Sons, 306 So. 2d 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (stating that riparians on the lake had standing to 
abate nuisance of defendant farmers discharging noxious chemicals and other substances into the lake); Panther Coal 
Co. v. Looney, 40 S.E.2d 298, 300–01 (Va. 1946) (finding that defendant company did not have a legal right to 
pollute the plaintiff landowner’s water in a material and substantial way even if that pollution was caused by the 
non-negligent, lawful operation of its mining business). 
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On the one hand, case law holds that there are some riparian rights that are 
considered property rights exclusive to the riparian owner.237 These include 
accretion, dereliction, access, wharfing, and view.238 But the stronger argument as to 
boating, fishing, and swimming is that these are public rights in navigable waters 
that exist under the Public Trust Doctrine, i.e., state ownership of the submerged 
lands held in trust for the public use. The weight of authority indicates that riparian 
owners merely share these rights as members of the public.239 And while riparian 
owners have a unique mode of access via their property, the loss of these public 
rights is not compensable to the riparian owner absent some special injury.240 On the 
other hand, a right to navigate on the waters may be upheld indirectly if it is the only 
means of access to the riparian property.241     
The least clear part of the analysis relates to pollution. But the statutory language 
in section 253.141, Florida Statutes, adds confusion by including in the body of 
riparian rights, those that “may be or have been defined by law.”242 Moreover, the 
doctrines of reasonable use, special status, and strict liability also lend ambiguity to 
the issue.243 The pollution cases generally involve nuisance actions for abatement.244 
Accordingly, the question of whether, under Florida law, a riparian owner has a legal 
right distinct from, larger than, or superior to, that of any member of the public to 
have the abutting navigable waters kept free of pollution, or to use the waters for 
boating, fishing, or swimming remains, at best, muddied. 
 
 ________________________  
 237. See Ferry Pass, 48 So. at 644–45 (discussing rights exclusive of riparian owners, rights held in common 
with the public by riparian owners, and superior rights held by the public). 
 238. Id.; see also Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So. 2d 
209, 214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). 
 239. See, e.g., Ferry Pass, 48 So. at 645. 
 240. Id. 
 241. See Medeira Beach Nominee, 272 So. 2d at 214. 
 242. FLA. STAT. § 253.141 (1) (2016). 
 243. See MALONEY, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 4, at 322–23 (discussing the reasonable 
use doctrine); MALONEY ET. AL., FLORIDA WATER LAW, supra note 210, at 481 (discussing special status); Cities 
Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799, 803 (Fla. Ct. App. 1975) (invoking strict liability). 
 244. MALONEY ET. AL., FLORIDA WATER LAW, supra note 210, at 333 (citing Wetzel v. Duda & Sons, 306 
So. 2d 533, 533–34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Nat’l Container Corp. v. State, 189 So. 4, 5 (Fla. 1939)). 
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